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Abstract—Recognizing, assessing, countering, and mitigating
the biases of different nature from heterogeneous sources is
a critical problem in designing a cognitive Decision Support
System (DSS). An example of such a system is a cognitive
biometric-enabled security checkpoint. Biased algorithms affect
the decision-making process in an unpredictable way, e.g. face
recognition for different demographic groups may severely im-
pact the risk assessment at a checkpoint. This paper addresses
a challenging research question on how to manage an en-
semble of biases? We provide performance projections of the
DSS operational landscape in terms of biases. A probabilistic
reasoning technique is used for assessment of the risk of such
biases. We also provide a motivational experiment using face
biometric component of the checkpoint system which highlights
the discovery of an ensemble of biases and the techniques to
assess their risks.
Keywords: Ensemble of biases, risk, trust, identity manage-
ment, computational intelligence
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive Decision Support System (DSS) is an integrated
part of various complex systems that are designed based
on the automated cognition concept, which is based on the
perception-action cycle. Examples of DSS include unmanned
aircraft systems [1], [2], biometric-enabled security check-
points [3], supply chain management [4], and automated
interviewing [3]. Performance of cognitive DSS is evaluated
in various dimensions:
− Technical, e.g. false accept and false reject rate [5],
− Social, e.g. public acceptance [6],
− Psychological, e.g. efficiency of human-machine interac-
tions [7]–[9], and
− Privacy and security domain, e.g. vulnerability of per-
sonal data [3], [6], [10].
Taxonomy and regulators such as risk, trust, and bias are
useful in the performance evaluation of complex dynamical
systems (Fig. 1). For example, trust to the artificial intelligence
(AI) interview assistant addresses the so-called AI (as well
as cognitive) biases [3]; risk and trust to DSS is related to
various kinds of biases, e.g. in human identification based
on face biometrics [11], [12] and social profiles [6]. This
paper focuses on risk and related assessment of an ensemble
of biases observed in a cognitive DSS, in particular, in a
cognitive security checkpoint. Specifically, we are interested
in the impact of biases on the DSS’s performance.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the problem: risk, trust, and bias are system regulators of
technical, social, psychological, and security performance at various decision-
making levels throughout various stages of human-machine and machine-
machine interactions of cognitive DSS.
Many kinds of biases in biometric-based DSS were iden-
tified and studied. However, dealing with an ensemble of
biases is an open problem. This is the focus of our interest.
In our study, we model the DSS as a complex multi-state
dynamic system [3], [13]. Each state is characterized by a
particular kind of bias. The research question is how to fuse
these biases in order to obtain the combined risk of biases
and related trust estimators.
Some preliminary results have been reported in the related
areas. In [14], a trust bias interpreted as a prior knowledge has
been incorporated into a non-probabilistic trust inference pro-
cedure. Three kinds of biases were distinguished: 1) a global
bias, 2) a trustor bias, and 3) a trustee bias. A probabilistic
network that is suited for approximate probabilistic confidence
reasoning for trust inference problems has been developed in
[15]. The DSS such as semi-automated cognitive checkpoint
deals with multiple (ensemble) of biases of different nature
from the following sources:
Bias ≡

Human Perception [8], [9] ;
Artificial Intelligence [3] ;
Biometrics [10]–[12];
Identity Management [3], [6]
A phenomenon of own-race bias is well-known in psy-
chology, the tendency to have better recognition for faces
of one’s racial ingroup rather than for racial outgroup faces
[8], was recently confirmed in face recognition experiments
[10]–[12]. The source of additional cognitive biases is human-
human interactions. The AI biases are introduced by intelligent
support of human-machine interactions [3]. Finally, identity
management bias was analyzed in multiple social profiles [6].
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While all these biases are different, they are probabilistic in
nature because the evidence and information gathered to make
a decision is always incomplete, often inconclusive, frequently
ambiguous, commonly dissonant, conflicting, and has various
degrees of believability. Trust and risk contribute to subject
acceptance and rejection, respectively. Trust deviation impacts
bias and vice versa. For example, by declining trust, one can
increase bias. Trust is characterized by risks taken by a trustor
in the presence of uncertainty.
The goal of this paper is to develop a bias-specific
projection of the DSS such as cognitive security checkpoints.
The performance of the security checkpoint is a good indicator
of technological progress. The checkpoint is a complex system
that includes various sensors, biometrics and data processing,
pattern recognition and decision-making components. It is also
an indicator of public acceptance of the privacy transformation.
The contributions of our study include: 1) a systematic view
on the risk-trust-bias impact on the cognitive DSS perfor-
mance, and 2) an approach to the ensemble of bias assessment
and operation.
This paper is organized as follows. After providing a back-
ground (Section II), our approach is introduced in Section III.
The details are highlighted in Section IV via an experiment.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Bias is an application-specific phenomenon in the real-
world:
− In statistics, bias refers to the tendency of a measurement
process to systematically over- or under-estimate the
value of a population parameter.
− In psychology, bias is a well-defined phenomenon: e.g.,
a customer bias is a deviation of the forecast from the
true expectation.
− In biometric systems, biases occur, for example, in the
form of a systematic difference between facial recognition
of individuals belonging to different demographic groups
(performance bias), a systematic decision-making mis-
take (prediction bias), and a systematic mis-classification
(classification bias).
− In Artificial Intelligence (AI), any machine learning-
based assessment has a bias. The key question is how to
teach an AI assistant to act within the ethical and legal
guidelines. Fairness detection can be referred to as AI
bias.
Identifying and mitigating bias is essential to build trust
between humans and machines. The machines can learn and
assess the related risks. Risk of the biased AI judgment is a
focus of interest in all AI applications, e.g. in medicine [16].
Various characteristics are needed for the performance
evaluation of the DSS. For example, the commonly used
false reject rate and false accept rate in decision-making are
affected by the level of the individual’s satisfactory and social
acceptance of profiling technologies. Other research challenges
include identifying biases in human biometric and behavior
recognition, in confidence estimation, AI trustworthiness, and
belief inference in machine reasoning. Each of these exten-
sions is considered over specific operational landscapes. For
example, bias cannot be propagated through system states,
but risk and trust of bias can be represented by probability
distributions and quantitatively assessed as probabilities.
Risk is a function of (a) an adverse impact, or magnitude of
the harm, that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs;
and (b) a likelihood of occurrence, Risk= F(Impact,
Probability) [17].
III. BIAS TAXONOMY AND OPERATIONAL LANDSCAPE
There are three phases of bias analysis in the DSS: 1)
Bias identification, e.g, what kind of biases are manifested
in a system? 2) Bias assessment, e.g. a unified metric for
different kinds of biases, such as the risk of bias; and 3)
Bias operation, e.g. fusion of risks of biases. Recent studies
are focused on bias identification such as demographic bias
in facial recognition [10]–[12] and AI bias [16]. This is a
starting point in cognitive DSS development. Given the DSS
multi-state model, the key requirements to the identified bias
are assessment metric that provides bias operations such as
propagation, adjustment, fusion, and prediction.
The aforementioned aspects of bias analysis are introduced
in Fig. 2 for the particular case of the DSS, cognitive security
checkpoint. The traveler’s identity management process is
implemented as a process that goes through multiple states
[3], [13]. Each state is characterized by a specific bias such as
bias in face recognition when using surveillance and ID check,
the bias of ID source reliability, etc. Statistics of these biases
are being used for machine learning. The biases are mostly
represented by the tailed probability distributions. A unified
metric of bias that we consider in this study is the risk of bias
and the related trust in the technology that is biased.
Fig. 2. Taxonomical projection of the cognitive security checkpoint in terms
of biases: biases are propagated between states, and at each state, their status
is analyzed, adjusted, fused, and predicted.
Given the risk of a particular bias, various operations can
be available with this risk value. For example, the forward
propagation reflects a process that relates the causes to their
respective effects. The bias backward propagation reflects
the bias assessment that traces the effects to their respective
causes. Forward and backward bias propagation provide a
systematic evaluation of the biases in traveler profiling or risk
assessment. These biases are caused by various threats, haz-
ards, and concerns, and are useful in deriving the cost-effective
measures for lowering these risks to an acceptable level. We
suggest that various techniques from related areas can be
adopted for this purpose, in particular, causal relationships of
risk factors and their propagation [18], risk propagation in
supply network [4], [19], as well as trust prediction and belief
propagation [20].
IV. MOTIVATIONAL EXPERIMENT
Fig. 3 illustrates various operations on biases. Bias is repre-
sented in metrics that must be compatible with metrics of risk
and trust. The latter is represented by probability distributions
of measures of the AI decision performance, decision relia-
bility, confidence, credibility, and trustability. These values, in
terms of posterior probabilities, can be inferred based on the
prior probabilities and the current observation or conditions.
The mechanism we apply for such inference is Bayesian, also
called belief networks.
The motivations of an experiment are as follows: 1) Ex-
plain the details of the ensemble bias assessment, and 2)
Introduce the essentials of reasoning mechanism. Our moti-
vational experiment addresses multiple biases in a cognitive
security checkpoint (Fig. 2) such as “ID Reliability Bias”, “ID
Validation Bias”, and “Trustworthiness Bias”. Among various
candidates of biases, we will consider “Face Recognition
Bias”. Few results on demographic bias in facial recognition
have been recently reported, in particular, in [10]–[12]. Our
motivational experiment aims at highlighting the practical
details of assessing an ensemble of biases.
A. Causal model
The causal network shown in Fig. 3 describes how the qual-
ity of facial recognition can be compromised by various facial
attributes that are “biased” based on the year-of-birth (YOB)
Y , gender G, ethnicity E, mustache H , beard B, and glasses
S. The parent nodes to the “Correctness” node represents the
bias attributed to face recognition. The “Correctness” node
presents the probability of the neural network in predicting
a positive (genuine subject) or negative (imposter) identity,
whereas the “Match” node determines whether the positive or
negative prediction matches the ground truth label.
Fig. 3. A simplified causal network of biases for facial recognition. Risk
is derived based on the results of the “Match”, and Trust is affected by the
Operator’s Bias
B. Formalization
The risk of the decision is evaluated based on the results
of the “Match” node. The Risk affects the perceived Trust,
which is also affected by the Operator’s Bias (such as trained
operator, inexperienced operator, perceived AI trustworthiness,
and other human factors). The Operator then can use their
judgment to adjust the parameters of the matcher in order
to improve the decision outcome, thus implementing the
“Perception-Action” cycle of the cognitive DSS. The adjust-
ment action, in turn, will affect the Operator’s trust in the
DSS decision. It should be noted that the trust assessment
would require the quantitative representation of the human
factor (Operator) bias, which was not evaluated in this ex-
periment. Therefore, we will focus on the risk assessment in
the experiment described below.
Risk is estimated as Risk= F(Impact,
Probability) which relates to the error rates of the
system, specifically the false non-match rate (FNMR) and
false match rate (FMR). At a high level of abstraction (e.g.
ignoring metric and dependencies), risk of a particular bias
RiskBias is defined as follows:
RiskBias = ImpactFMR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of a FMR
×ErrorFMR︸ ︷︷ ︸
FMR
+ ImpactFNMR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of a FNMR
×ErrorFNMR︸ ︷︷ ︸
FNMR
(1)
For example, given the scenario of a security checkpoint,
the FMR is related to a wrongly granted access, while the
FNMR contributes to travelers’ inconvenience. The impact of
the FMR is a breach of security which, given this scenario,
should have a high impact. The impact of the FNMR is a
negative user experience which is rather of a low impact. Using
this scenario, we assign a 10:1 ratio, that is ImpactFMR =
10 and ImpactFNMR = 1. Given the Year-of-Birth (YOB)
attribute, the risk for individuals born in the 1930s is computed
as follows: 10× 0.0208 + 1× 0.0012 = 0.2092 .
The ensemble risk bias in identifying (matching) a particular
individual RiskBias(Ensemble) is assessed as the sum of
the risk biases according to his/her attributes:
RiskBias(Ensemble) =
N∑
Bias=1
RiskBias (2)
where Bias represents one of the attributes, Y,G,E,H,B,
and S in Fig. 3, N = 6.
C. Experimental setup
For this experiment, we demonstrate biases using the
FERET face database. The database was collected between
August 1993 and July 1996 and contains a total of 14,126
images, including 1199 individual subjects [21]. The FERET
database was chosen because of its detailed meta-data informa-
tion which includes information such as gender, year-of-birth,
ethnicity, and pose.
The typical performance of face recognition includes ac-
curacy, FNMR, and FMR and are defined as Accuracy =
TP+TN
FP+FN+TP+TN , FNMR =
FN
FN+TP , and FMR =
FP
FP+TN ,
where TP are true positives (correct prediction identity), TN
are true negatives (correct prediction of imposter), FP are
false positives (incorrect prediction of identity), FN are false
negatives (incorrect prediction of imposter).
The features used for face identification is extracting using
a pre-trained Resnet50 convolutional neural network. The
features are then passed through a fully-connected layer and
softmax activation to perform identification. The model is
trained using stochastic gradient descent with a learning rate
lr = 0.0001 and a momentum of 0.9 for 100 epochs.
D. Results
The overall identification accuracy, FNMR, and FMR for
the FERET dataset are reported in Table I. The results are
separated based on the biases such as gender, year-of-birth,
ethnicity, and facial attributes (glasses, beard, and mustache).
The performance measures are evaluated based on the Rank-1
results. Given a baseline accuracy of 91.63%, positive biases
are highlighted in green while negative biases are high-
lighted in red. For example, observing the attribute year-of-
birth, a significant bias is shown as the year-of-birth increases,
specifically significant bias against younger individuals. An
accuracy difference of 17.65% between those born in the
1920s and the 1980s. The FNMR and FMR for each bias
are computed based on the bias nodes of the causal network
shown in Fig. 3.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF THE FACE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS IN TERMS OF THE
ACCURACY, FNMR, AND FMR (FERET DATASET).
Method Accuracy FNMR FMR
Baseline 0.9163 0.0941 0.0001
Female 0.8908 0.1233 0.0003
Male 0.9308 0.0749 0.0001
1920s 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1930s 0.9697 0.0208 0.0012
1940s 0.9667 0.0443 0.0004
1950s 0.9513 0.0625 0.0003
1960s 0.9122 0.1020 0.0004
1970s 0.8873 0.1124 0.0003
1980s 0.8235 0.1875 0.0105
Asian 0.9424 0.0664 0.0003
Black-or-African-American 0.9195 0.0984 0.0014
Hispanic 0.8254 0.1981 0.0033
Native-American 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Other 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pacific-Islander 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
White 0.9119 0.0965 0.0002
No Glasses 0.9214 0.0923 0.0001
Glasses 0.8859 0.1028 0.0009
No Beard 0.9134 0.0976 0.0001
Beard 0.9615 0.0357 0.0007
No Mustache 0.9144 0.0947 0.0001
Mustache 0.9328 0.0891 0.0008
Table II illustrates the effect of biases on the accuracy
of the chosen classifier in identifying 11 randomly selected
subjects with their associated attributes. The top 3 identity
predictions (with their respective score values) are shown in
the last three columns. The first 8 subjects are samples
of correctly identified subjects, while the last 3 subjects
are incorrectly identified subjects when using only the
top/rank-1 prediction. The highlighted results indicate a
match to the ground truth label. The score values indicate that
if we choose to use a threshold-based method of classification,
it is not possible to decisively separate the genuine and
imposter scores. Only the top 5 scores of each prediction are
used for creating the genuine and imposter scores. Scores,
representing the similarity between faces, are generated from
the penultimate layer of the neural network. Similar/identical
faces generate large scores while unrelated faces produce
low/negative scores. Through softmax normalization, the sets
of scores are converted into probabilities. Due to the expo-
nential nature of softmax normalization, lower scores, when
converted to probabilities, are effectively reduced to zero, and
thus, should not influence the decision-making process.
E. Reasoning on risk of bias
The model for reasoning upon the probability distribution
of matching scores and the chosen biases is a probabilistic
graphical model called Bayesian, or belief, network is shown
in Fig. 3. This is a causal network with the assigned Condi-
tional Probability Tables (CPTs). Bayesian inference is applied
to the CPTs to update the probability given evidence of various
biases. Example of calculation the prior probabilities for the
parent nodes in the belief network (Fig. 3) is as follows:
Gender
G Male Female
Pr(G) 0.6383 0.3617
Wear Glasses
S True False
Pr(S) 0.1425 0.8575
These prior probabilities are vital for calculating the pos-
terior probabilities representing the impact of biases on the
resulting matching rate. It should be noted that for better
dealing with uncertainty and conflicts, more advanced metrics
rather than point probabilities as in Bayesian networks can be
chosen to be applied in the causal network. These metrics of
uncertainty include interval probabilities, fuzzy probabilities,
as well as Demster-Shafer and Dezert-Smaradache extensions
[13].
Any bias scenario can be represented by a causal network,
e.g. Bayesian network. Using the reported performance from
Table I for risk estimation and an impact factor of 1 for
both FNMR and FMR, the baseline risk of bias is computed
according to Equation (2) as 1 ·0.0941+1 ·0.0001 = 0.0942 .
Let the attribute such as gender be known. Then the risk of
bias is evaluated as follows:
RiskBias(Female) = ImpactFMR × ErrorFemaleFMR
+ ImpactFNMR × ErrorFemaleFNMR
= 1× 0.1233 + 1× 0.0003 = 0.1236 ;
RiskBias(Male) = ImpactFMR × ErrorMaleFMR
+ ImpactFNMR × ErrorMaleFNMR
= 1× 0.0749 + 1× 0.0001 = 0.0750
The risk associated with females (0.1236) is higher than
males (0.0750) due to the recognition model being gender-
biased. This can be reasoned due to a larger representation of
males in the dataset, as evident in the prior node for gender
distribution.
TABLE II
BIAS PHENOMENON OF THE FACIAL RECOGNITION PROCESS: ATTRIBUTES FOR RANDOM SUBJECTS (FERET DATASET).
Subject Year of Gender Ethnicity Facial Features Top Subject PredictionsBirth Glasses Beard Mustache First ( Score ) Second ( Score ) Third ( Score )
15 1970s Male Asian False False False 15 ( 11.8175 ) 913 ( 7.9727 ) 612 ( 7.5015 )
189 1970s Female Asian False False False 189 ( 15.7484 ) 434 ( 8.5322 ) 566 ( 6.9052 )
143 1970s Female Hispanic False False False 143 ( 12.1884 ) 402 ( 6.6154 ) 763 ( 5.4235 )
295 1980s Female Black-or-African-American False False False 295 ( 14.4057 ) 364 ( 6.6878 ) 808 ( 6.2970 )
561 1940s Male Asian False False False 561 ( 10.4680 ) 187 ( 6.6516 ) 695 ( 6.0315 )
917 1940s Female Hispanic False False False 917 ( 10.5805 ) 251 ( 6.8186 ) 972 ( 6.5261 )
948 1950s Male White False False True 948 ( 10.7142 ) 330 ( 5.4853 ) 962 ( 5.1746 )
684 1930s Male Asian False False False 684 ( 7.7132 ) 501 ( 6.3049 ) 775 ( 5.7674 )
0 1940s Male White True False False 457 ( 8.0854 ) 0 ( 6.7735 ) 348 ( 6.3287 )
774 1950s Female White False False False 704 ( 9.4579 ) 801 ( 7.3339 ) 942 ( 7.0282 )
255 1960s Female White False False False 924 ( 8.8947 ) 255 ( 7.0531 ) 270 ( 6.9886 )
To evaluate the perceived trust of the Operators in the
matcher decision, the Operator’s bias shall be taken into
account. As well, based on the assessed risk, the Operator can
take action in adjusting the parameters of the matcher such as
the decision threshold, since the Operator wishes to improve
the trustworthiness of the decision. Another cycle of inference
can be performed, while this time the risk is interpreted as
evidence of the existing bias. This “Perception-Action” cycle
of the cognitive DSS will lead to continuous re-assessment of
the risk and trust in the DSS decision.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our study addresses the probabilistic reasoning as a mecha-
nism for assessing an ensemble of biases aiming at their further
propagation, adjustment, fusion, and prediction. In real-world
cognitive DSS scenarios, each risk of bias in the ensemble is
introduced by a probability distribution function (pdf) rather
than CPTs as considered in the motivational example. The
future research avenue here would be to perform a fusion of
pdf(s) using the standard copula technique that shall result in
the joint pdf. Marginalization will result in conditional pdf(s)
that are assigned to the nodes of the causal network. The
followed up reasoning mechanism will allow for inferences
of risks and trust in the causal model.
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